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Abstract 
 
 
This paper focuses on the process of workers’ self-management 
brought about by a wave of factory occupations, which has taken 
place in Argentina in the last few years, with the support of 
preliminary evidence from qualitative fieldwork conducted in four 
factories. The aim of the paper is to explore the dynamics of the 
decision-making and the re-organisation of the labour process in the 
light of the constraints imposed on self-management by market 
mediations. The act of occupying a factory, gives room to workers’ 
control of the labour process and to a more democratic, collective 
decision-making. But workers’ need to compete in the market 
reduces the sphere of collective decision, leading to centralisation of 
power and divisions between directive and productive workers, 
hampering the possibility for workers to enrich their job and avoid 
self-exploitation.  
 
 
Keywords: Argentina, decision-making process, factories 
occupations, workers’ self-management, work re-organisation  
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Introduction 
 
The turn of the century found Argentina in a state of economic and 
political turmoil. On the one side, the economic downturn 
experienced by the country between 1998 and 2002, by leaving 
hundreds of companies in a situation of bankruptcy and thousands 
of wage-workers facing the prospect of unemployment, threatened 
the livelihoods of the subaltern classes as a whole. On the other 
side, the combination of instability in the political alignments and 
divisions in the ruling elite with a process of popular mobilisation, 
led to the social upheaval that brought down the Government in 
December 2001. In this context, thousands of workers gradually 
began to take control of the machinery, buildings and installations 
of the factories in crisis or abandoned by their owners, and re-
started the production as a mean to guarantee their survival. The 
occupations were thus originated as a defensive action against job 
losses in the midst of massive unemployment (Martínez & Vocos 
2002). 
 
A recent official survey has identified 161 factories, mainly 
concentrated in the Great Buenos Aires, with a workforce of 7135 
(Ministerio de Trabajo 2005), but sources differ in this respect 
(Palomino 2005; Fajn 2003). More than a quarter are metallurgical 
companies followed by food processing, meat packing and printing 
companies. Yet, it is possible to find cases in activities like health 
and educational services, supermarkets and hotels. According to 
Rebón (2004a), the ideal-typical case would be an approximately 40 
years old small or medium factory, which used to employ at its peak 
between 45 and 100 workers and downsized its structure over the 
last two decades expelling around two-thirds of its workforce. In the 
 3
main, they were the victims of the market oriented reforms, which 
opened the economy to international competition. Factors like lack 
of financial support, technological backwardness and changes in the 
structure of costs, among others, contribute to explain why these 
particular companies failed to adapt to the new competitive 
environment (Briner & Cusmano 2003).  
 
After the occupation, workers had to face not only organisational 
and productive but also political and legal challenges to start up the 
production under self-management. In this sense, a critical aspect 
has been the legal framework. In the beginning the debate 
oscillated around forming co-operatives or demanding the 
nationalisation of the factories under workers’ control, but with this 
latter solution ruled out by authorities’, the constitution of 
traditional co-operatives remained the only viable way to legally 
operate in the market.  
 
However, these new co-operatives differ in principle from well-
established and traditional ones in several aspects. One obvious and 
crucial point is their birthmark: they are the outcome of the 
occupation of a private property. This meant, in the majority of 
cases, the existence of bitter struggles and conflicts, frequently 
including the use of police repression (or its threat) to evict workers 
from the premises and restore the former property. Because of this 
history of struggle and resistance, in these companies a radical co-
operative ethos predominate, in which the central role attributed to 
the assembly in the decision-making process, the elimination of 
supervisory posts, the values attributed to self-management and 
the equal distribution of income are paramount.  
 
Considering the range of the theoretical and practical issues 
involved, it comes at no surprise that the process of factory 
occupations has called the attention of a wide range of political 
activists, journalists and scholars in Argentina. Academic research 
has mainly revolved around four approaches used, often, in 
combination.  
 
First, sociologically informed studies that describe the main 
innovative features of the factory occupations and the context in 
which these have occurred (Fajn 2003; Rebón 2004a, 2004b). 
Second, studies that show interest for the features adopted by the 
labour process and the decision-making within these companies 
(Deledicque et al. 2004; Deledicque & Moser 2005; Fajn & Rebón 
2005; Fernández Alvarez 2003, 2005; Ghibaudi 2004). Third, 
studies that focus on the occupations from the perspective of the 
social movement and collective action frameworks (Davolos & 
Perelman 2004; Palomino 2005), stressing their contribution to 
 4
building new social values, new organisational forms and new 
modes of mobilisation. Finally, studies which explore the impact of 
the process of occupations and self-management on workers’ 
subjectivity (Antón & Rebón 2005; Davolos & Perelman 2004; 
Deledicque et al. 2004).  
 
These trends of research have made important contributions to a 
better understanding of the phenomenon. All of them, in turn, 
stress the radical agenda arising from workers’ practical needs over 
the process of occupations. However, it is the premise of this paper 
that they do not pay enough attention to the extent to which the 
market logic itself has limited the range of the radical changes 
pursued by workers after the occupations. Thus, this paper aims at 
providing empirical evidence of this dimension. Its starting point is 
that the study of changes in the labour process and decision- 
making should take into account the full circuit of capital (Kelly 
1985, Lebowitz 2003). This perspective, emphasising the dynamics 
existing between the changes in the sphere of production and the 
constraints emanating from the sphere of circulation, is crucial to 
any assessment on the future of workers’ self-management.  
 
The paper begins by presenting the theoretical and methodological 
framework of the research. After that, on the basis of four case 
studies, the main section of the paper will be devoted to provide 
evidence of the limits and contradictions imposed by market 
dynamics on workers’ radical agenda in the realm of production. On 
the basis of this evidence, the concluding section, addressing the 
main theoretical questions, will sum up the findings of the research.  
 
 
Theoretical issues 
 
The issue of workers’ self-management has a long pedigree in social 
thought as it involves crucial and complex questions on alternative 
social systems of production. In this sense, it has always been 
central to a wide range of studies and debates: from the analysis of 
historical episodes of factory occupations (Gramsci 1970) to the 
politics of workers’ control (Hyman 1974, Tomlinson 1980, Wajcman 
1983), from the institutions of workers’ councils (van der Linden 
2004) to the fate of the Yugoslav self-managing market socialism 
(Lebowitz 2006). Yet, it is the debate focused on the emancipatory 
potential of the co-operative movement in the field of production 
(Egan 1990), as it has been developed within the Marxist tradition, 
which comprises the most appropriate theoretical discussions for 
the purpose of this paper.  
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Can workers’ co-operatives be the vehicle for radical and democratic 
change or their emancipatory potential is destined to degenerate 
due to the logic of market competition?  
 
Marx saw in workers’ cooperatives a progressive resolution of the 
antagonistic nature of the supervision of the labour process under 
capitalism as management becomes “a function of labour instead of 
capital” (Egan 1990: 71). For him, the workers’ cooperative “was a 
practical demonstration that capital was not necessary as a 
mediator in social production” (Lebowitz 2003: 89), and then, that 
wage-labour was just a transitory and historical social form. Yet, 
Marx often underlined the limits that workers’ cooperatives 
encounter within the capitalist system since these “naturally 
reproduce, and must reproduce everywhere in their actual 
organization all the shortcomings of the prevailing system” (Marx 
1967: 440).  
 
Bernstein’s opinion on workers’ cooperatives was somehow 
ambiguous. On the one side, he was critical of industrial 
cooperatives. For him, these were associations for sale and 
exchange, which had a tendency towards exclusiveness and 
oligarchy opposed to the interests of the community (Bernstein 
1899). Additionally, market competition would either distort their 
internal democratic content or condemn these experiences to 
failure. On the contrary, the associations of purchasers, the 
cooperatives stores, by striving for keeping down prices and the 
profit rate, in practice, would pursue the aims of the community as 
a whole, contributing to safeguard industrial cooperatives from 
market competition. Then, the combination of both types of 
associations was deemed to be for Bernstein a suitable instrument 
for gradual social change.  
 
Luxemburg was to react angrily against this reformist programme. 
She would underline the hybrid character of workers’ cooperatives - 
as cooperatives “can be described as small units of socialised 
production within capitalist exchange” (Luxemburg 1900); and 
besides, no consumer cooperative, a la Bernstein, would encourage 
the development of workers’ associations in the most important 
branches of production. Since cooperatives were “totally incapable 
of transforming the capitalist mode of production” (Luxemburg 
1900), she stressed that the only way to survive within capitalism 
keeping a democratic content was “by removing themselves 
artificially from the influence of the laws of free competition” 
(Luxemburg 1900), precisely, the role to be fulfilled by purchaser 
associations in Bernstein’s model. 
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Since then, most Marxist writers tended to adopt an utter negative 
attitude towards workers’ cooperatives. Mandel’s writings are 
perhaps the most extreme and well-known examples of this 
development. In his view, there is no real or meaningful self-
management insofar it is limited to single companies operating 
within the market. Thus, revolutionary strategies built upon factory 
occupations and self-management are considered utopian dreams, 
which ultimately deny the role played by the State in securing 
domination under capitalism (Mandel 1970, 1974).  
 
By contrast, some recent attempts have stressed the radical and 
democratic potential of workers’ cooperatives, and the chance that 
given certain conditions, this content could survive against the 
market odds. For instance, Egan (1990) has argued that the 
relationship between workers’ cooperatives and capitalist markets is 
mediated by the balance of class forces. Insofar as “the cooperative 
sector is grounded in a context of radical working-class self-
organization, it acquires the material strength and cooperative 
consciousness necessary for survival in a hostile environment” 
(Egan 1990: 82). In turn, applying the Gramscian notion of war of 
position, Baldacchino (1990: 475) has argued for an active strategy 
directed towards “diluting or counteracting the sources of 
degeneration” of the democratic content of self-management based 
on counter-institutional support for workers’ cooperatives. In short, 
both authors recognise the limitations that even the most radical 
experiences of self-management have to tolerate in a capitalist 
market, while acknowledging “the positive qualitative developments 
which such organizations reflect” (Egan 1990: 76) and the likelihood 
of reinforcing them through an appropriate strategy.  
 
Overall, these debates show that analyses of workers’ self-
management must not isolate theoretically the sphere of production 
from the relationships that workers establish in the sphere of 
circulation to buy inputs, sell the products and reproduce 
themselves and their families. 
 
This is something rather neglected in the current literature on 
workers’ occupations in Argentina as scholars, while often 
acknowledging the existence of market limitations, have however 
preferred to explain the changes occurred in the factories by 
focusing on agency rather than structural factors. Instead, the key 
insight of this paper, is that “just as capital is the mediator for 
wage-labour, separating the worker from her labour-power as 
property, from her labour as activity and from the product of her 
labour – so also is capital the mediator between wage-labourers in 
each moment of the circuit of capital” (Lebowitz 2003: 88). So, self-
managed factories achieve the replacement of capital as a mediator 
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between the worker and her labour-power, which otherwise should 
be sold as a commodity, and also both in the direction and 
supervision of production, and in the ownership of the products of 
labour. Yet, self-managed workers cannot get rid of the mediation 
of capital in the sphere of circulation as owner of other means of 
production and articles of consumption, that is, when buying inputs 
and selling outputs, and when workers individually engage in their 
own reproduction.  
 
This theoretical background sets the basis of our research. Empirical 
data will thus be used to test how market competition constrains 
workers’ democratic achievements both in terms of decision-making 
and work re-structuring, while acknowledging like Egan (1990) and 
Baldacchino (1990) that this does not necessarily mean that 
workers’ experiences of self-management are to entirely succumb 
to the logic of market.  
 
 
Methodology 
 
This paper’s fieldwork, part of an on-going research project on 
workers’ self-management in Argentina, has been conducted in 4 
factories in the Province of Buenos Aires during the months of 
January and February 2006. The paper’s preliminary findings are 
based on the data collected in the first part of the project, while 
work was in progress on 6 more factories. 
 
Cases have been selected by using criteria of diversification, so to 
gather information on both work re-organisation and the decision-
making process from factories with different production processes 
(construction, printing, show makers, paper production). Both in-
depth qualitative semi-structured interviews and participant 
observation have been used. 
 
Participant observation oscillates from full participation (typically 
represented by getting a working role in the organisation) to less 
engaged external observation (note taking, informal chats, and 
observation of different phases of production, workers’ assemblies 
and informal gatherings). In our case this latter set of techniques 
was preferred considering the aim, scope and context of the 
research. 
 
Participant observation has been important to check the veracity of 
interviewees’ descriptions through data triangulation, and thus, to 
understand how concretely work is (re) organised and decisions are 
taken.  
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Not always workers on the line - due to their dependency on the 
speed of production, were able to talk extendedly. Thus although 
we have tried to select the interviews by a criteria of diversification, 
in the factories studied, two third of the 12 people formally 
interviewed occupied representative/administrative positions. Their 
knowledge of the labour process may have not exactly matched 
with the reality. However the cross checks of field notes and 
interviews did not apparently show substantial differences in terms 
of labour process’s description, as the majority of those in the 
administration had a past as production workers. By the contrary, 
attendance at assembly proved to be very useful in terms of getting 
a detailed description of issues discussed and to assess how 
discretional was the power of leaders/workers’ delegate.  
  
Considering the aim of the paper, fieldwork questions have been 
formulated around the following two clusters. 
 
As for the decision-making process, we have been looking at issues 
of democracy and participation in the assembly, at the issues 
discussed in these meetings, at the relations between this latter and 
the directive council, at the role of leaders, and at the existence of 
informal channels of communication and decision-making.  
 
As for the labour process, we have been investigating the relation 
between production and direction work, the distribution of tasks 
within the collective of workers, the rhythms of production, the 
distribution of income, the coordination of production, the 
opportunity for personal development, and how discipline and 
control are enforced.  
 
The case studies 
 
This research is based on workers’ experiences of self-management 
in 4 factories located in the Great Buenos Aires: Unión Papelera 
Platense (UPP, paper production), Gráfica Patricios (Patricios, 
printing), Cooperativa Unidos por el Calzado (CUC, shoes makers), 
Unión Solidaria de Trabajadores (UST, construction). The factories 
employ respectively 55, 30, 110 and 65 workers. In each case, the 
number of workers was almost doubled since the productive activity 
restarted. Technological backwardness, old machines and 
precarious installations characterise all the factories, with the partial 
exception of Patricios.  
 
The factories adopted the status of a cooperative as the legal 
property form. Each cooperative has its own statute book that 
establishes some basic rules and regulate rights and duties of the 
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members. The general assembly and a directive council are the 
organs that formally take decisions.  
 
In the first three cases the occupation followed the bankruptcy or 
the deep economic crisis of the company, a situation in which 
workers were the first victims with wage credits for thousand of 
pesos and unpaid employers’ social security contributions. The 
struggle to defend the occupation, reinforced the internal cohesion 
and created the conditions for the establishments of solidarity links 
with the community and workers from other occupied factories. 
 
All these cooperatives are taking advantage of the recovery of the 
economy and the internal market expansion after the devaluation of 
the national currency, with the sole exception of CUC that is 
experiencing the difficulties involved in the start-up of the 
productive activities.  
 
 
Radical changes in the context of market competition: 
empirical evidence  
 
There is a tangible tension emerging from workers’ own accounts 
and the observation of self-management. Workers defend their own 
power over the organisation of production and the decision-making 
process by proudly stressing their freedom from direct/supervisory 
control, the existence of equalitarian relations and the benefits of 
democratic participation. At the same time, they are compelled to 
take pragmatic decisions in the everyday market life of the co-
operative that implicitly limit and compromise the extent of the 
radical changes introduced. Under the pressure of guaranteeing 
their own survival workers subvert the power relations, which 
underpin the capitalist employment relationship. However, it is only 
as the process of self-management developed that workers became 
conscious of the radical character of the changes introduced. But, 
how far are they conscious of market constraints? Are they aware of 
this but accepting the compromise? In any case, what are the 
consequences for self-management?  
 
Thus, consequent with the research objectives and the theoretical 
concerns previously raised, this section aims to provide concrete 
examples on how market competition interferes and limits the 
extent of the changes introduced by workers after the occupations, 
both in relation to the decision-making process and the re-
organisation of work. The adoption of this focus should help to 
evaluate the prospects of self-management in the co-operatives 
under study.  
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a) Who decides what?  
 
Regarding the decision-making process, the factories studied do not 
differ consistently from similar experiences analysed by other 
scholars (Deledicque et al. 2004; Fajn 2003; Fernández Alvarez 
2003).  
 
The assembly is considered as the main organ for decisions and the 
place where each worker can freely express his/her opinion. The 
directive council, elected by the assembly, is in charge of the daily 
administration, commercial responsibilities, legal representation and 
executive tasks. 
 
According to the data collected through direct observation, an 
assembly normally addresses the list of priorities prepared by the 
directive council and suggestions from individuals or groups of 
workers. A standard meeting may include information and decision-
taking about: technical problems related to the production line, 
investments in new machines or maintenance, market perspectives, 
relationships with clients, income distribution, the development of 
new products, legal matters, the recruitment of new workers, 
extension of the working day and holidays, participation in 
demonstrations and solidarity events, and so forth. General 
assemblies are held regularly during the year with a minimum fixed 
in the statute book of each factory and with more frequency 
depending on the urgency of debating issues considered of 
fundamental importance. Factories differ greatly, however, in this 
respect.  
 
While the UST and CUC hold meetings frequently, the UPP and 
Patricios organise just a few over the year. Whether this variability 
seems to express, in part, differences in the commitment of their 
respective directive councils with workers’ participation, it manifests 
structural pressures. Objective factors, like the features of the 
labour process and market pressures, condition the existence of 
formal or informal organs for workers’ participation and democracy. 
For instance, according to the workers, longer working days – up to 
twelve hours - and the requirements of continuous production line 
are among the factors which conspire against more frequent 
meetings in the UPP. Direct observation confirmed that in order to 
gather all workers, machines must be completely stopped there. In 
the case of Patricios, while production can be interrupted without 
much compromise for the quality of the targeted outputs, the 
rhythms and timing of production remain strictly dependant on 
delivery deadlines fixed by clients’ changing demands. This 
condition makes difficult the coordination between different shifts 
and thus, certain regularity for mass meetings. Nevertheless, this 
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deficiency seems somehow corrected by an efficient system of 
representation in the directive council, composed of delegates from 
each section. By the contrary, in the case of CUC, working time on a 
single shift, workers’ physical proximity and delivery deadlines 
slightly more flexible, give room for a certain frequency of both 
formal and informal meetings.  
 
Despite these differences, it is important to mention that, in all the 
cases, workers have always guaranteed, by statute, the possibility 
to force the directive councils to call for a mass meeting, provided 
that, at least, a minimum number of them formulate a common 
request. Hence, legal instruments for a “democracy from below” are 
always provided and this may certainly be considered one of the 
pillars, albeit formal, of self-management that workers do not seem 
willing to compromise. However, if the existence of formal or 
informal organs for workers’ participation and democracy certainly 
helps to develop better communication, this does not necessarily 
imply horizontality in the decision-making process.  
 
Crucial to evaluate the extent of horizontality in decision-making is 
the dynamic of the relationship between workers’ and directive 
council prerogatives. In this regards, a constant tension seems 
always to be present between the need to collectively share 
information and decision-making, and the need to centralise the 
same process in the hands of a restricted number of workers.  
 
As it was paternalistically stated by a member of CUC’s directive 
council, when stressing the need for a degree of autonomy in the 
‘executive decisions’: 
 
‘In my opinion it is important that a directive council keeps its own 
space for decision I have workmates in the directive council that 
cannot take a decision if the workmates in the assembly have not 
decided. And I say: this does not work. Because the directive 
council has to take a decision, the workmates need to believe in a 
leader, somebody that can tell them what is correct’. 
 
Despite this tension, the search for consensus and wide 
participation is central in all the factories and workers, at both 
coordinating and productive levels, are explicitly committed to it. 
Even in those cases, Patricios and the UPP for instance, where the 
calls for the general assembly are less frequent, informal channels 
of communications and feedback from the shop-floor do exist. In 
the following quotation, the person responsible for marketing in 
Patricios gives an example of the steps that constitute the process 
of informal communication and decision: 
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‘Once I get a new client, I then need to manage this internally, I 
need to organise meetings with people of all the sections, to explain 
to them what we are asked to produce, in what quantity, in which 
quality, and once all this has been explained check that it is really 
implemented… We do not have supervisors, bosses, nothing, so it is 
more like that specific functions are delegated, I know who is the 
responsible for a certain operation, let’s say that I know who are 
the leaders’.  
 
Yet, the building-process of democratic consensus is often 
constrained by the pressures arising from the mediation of capital in 
the sphere of circulation. The markets where these companies need 
to insert themselves do not require consensus but immediate 
decisions. There are always “practical” reasons that influence the 
possibility to adopt decisions collectively and interrupt regular 
exchanges of information in the plants: the necessity to maintain a 
constant flux of production, the due date for the delivery of new 
products, a quick answer to catch a new business opportunity.  
 
As stated by an interviewee: 
 
‘We have lost some opportunities for our slowness to convince 
people, because sometimes you need to convince your workmates, 
they cannot see the business...’ (CUC, directive council). 
 
This last point, that decisions need to be taken in relation to 
business, is particularly important as it establishes an a priori 
agenda interfering on the democratic decision-making process.  
 
The experience of self-management in a market economy forces the 
workers to take on commercial tasks: they have to become sellers 
of their production, find new markets, maintain commercial 
relationships with suppliers and customers, advertise their products, 
deal with banks, keep the books of the firm, and so forth. As white 
collar workers’ did not participate in the occupations, workers have 
had to cope somehow with these multiple commercial issues.  
 
In all the cases under study, these tasks are carried out by two or 
three workers together with members of the directive council. 
Indeed, this division between workers in charge of 
commercial/administrative tasks and those dedicated to production 
tends to be preserved and reinforced by obstacles to job rotation 
related to skill specialisation. Thus, material conditions promote the 
development of a special layer of workers that because immersed in 
clerical and commercial work functional to the market, show a 
greater disposition to adopt a commercial pragmatism. 
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In this sense, the case of the re-organisation of the administrative 
and commercial function reinforces the main argument of the paper. 
An objective factor, the need to sell in the market and to deal with 
customers, imposes the creation of a specific function and material 
pressures towards delegation and skill specialisation. Then, for 
those performing this function, the necessity to be market 
responsive becomes the primary concern. Thus a subjective 
attitude, the adoption of a commercial pragmatism, imposed by an 
objective factor is subsequently re-produced in the discourse 
dominating in the workplace, re-creating the conditions for the 
supremacy of market logic. In turn, because of the urgency of the 
realisation of commodities, given the vulnerable situation of these 
factories, workers in the administration tend to increase their power 
in relation to those in production.  
 
The detachment between those who perform manual activities and 
those who commit to organising, planning and marketing manifests 
culturally, through apathy, lack of participation and dismissive 
attitudes among the workforce towards others’ responsibilities.  
 
In particular, despite their relative dependence on those in charge 
of the administration and commercialisation, there are prejudices 
among manual workers against clerical work; thus, they tend to 
dodge administrative and commercial tasks reinforcing the division. 
Besides, manual workers usually dismiss those performing these 
functions. On the contrary, those who carry out administrative and 
commercial work complain about these attitudes: 
 
‘Many of those who are in production think “people who are there at 
the administrative section are just sitting about” but it is not like 
this, you have to answer the phone, to fill forms and send paper… I 
used to think the same, I always comment on this with the 
workmates, and they laugh, but now I recognise how difficult it is’ 
(CUC, administration, former production worker).  
 
 
Yet, this tendency to delegate the administrative and commercial 
activities to a small group of workers and, consequently, reduce the 
sphere of active participation does not, however, mean a passive 
acceptance. Workers have a real power to ask information, demand 
the organisation of meetings, and decide collectively. Thus, while 
the division between those inside and outside the directive council, 
which overlaps with the division between those performing manual 
and those performing administrative/commercial tasks, recreates 
the conditions for the development of a particular type of an “us” 
and “them” culture, though far from the reproduction of the same 
relations existing before the occupations.  
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All these contradictions emanate from the features of workers’ 
cooperative property. On the one hand, there are material 
conditions, which reduce the opportunities for workers’ 
participation, and hence, encourage apathy and the transfer of the 
collective responsibility to leaders and directive council members. 
On the other hand, the new production relations enjoyed by self-
managed workers along with their concrete interests in the well 
being of the company they now truly own, make them contest those 
with prerogatives to take certain decisions on behalf of the 
collective worker.  
 
The problems raised in this section should let us present in more 
realistic terms the processes of decision-making and the degree of 
horizontality reached by the self-managed workers of the factories 
under study (Fajn and Rebon 2005; Fernández Álvarez 2003). 
However, the dynamic of the relationships between assemblies and 
directive councils, the differences between leaders and lay workers, 
the inherent ambiguities in the workers’ passage from dependency 
to self-management, do also tell us of the democratically enriching 
process experienced by workers in the self-managed factories. 
 
b) The labour process under workers’ self-management 
 
In the attempt to establish a causal connection between changes in 
the labour process under workers’ self-management and market 
competition, two main areas of analysis were identified: on the one 
side, technology and the division of labour and the other side, the 
elimination of supervisory posts and forms of discipline 
enforcement. As for the decision-making process, changes in the 
labour process do tell us of both market influence and workers’ 
defence of those self-management achievements already 
considered as irreversible. 
 
b.1.) Technology and the division of labour  
 
The technical division of labour within the four productive unities 
under study has remained untouched and this confirms what has 
also been shown by other studies (Fajn & Rebón 2005; Fernández 
Álvarez 2003; Deledicque & Moser 2005; Deledicque et al. 2004). 
Moreover, the possibility of a restructuring of the labour process 
does not even appear to be among the explicit objectives of 
workers. 
 
Some studies (Antón & Rebón 2005; Fajn 2003; Fajn & Rebón 
2005; Fernández Álvarez 2003, 2005; Rebón 2004a, 2004b) seem 
to have found in this fact an index of an undeveloped political 
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consciousness. Hence, they explain the absence of changes in the 
labour process as a variable ultimately dependent on workers’ 
subjectivity. However, these accounts remain one-sided insofar as 
they do not incorporate the structural determinants underlying this 
situation.  
 
Technology is the first factor conditioning workers’ ability to 
introduce changes in the labour process. This is so, mainly, when 
workers are appendices of an automatic and continuous process of 
production dictated by an integrated system of machines, as in the 
case of the UPP.  
 
When in the production line labour is performed by the combined 
use of simple machines, whose operation depends on skilled 
workers, and by automatic machines, some minor changes seem to 
have occurred (for instance, in Patricios unification of sections and 
task design in CUC). This, in particular, may be noted in the case of 
skilled workers operating simple machines. In the case of the UST, 
by contrast, the activity comprises a variety of autonomous tasks, 
which depended on workers’ ability to manage simple tools, and 
therefore, the labour process there is a diffuse result of multiple 
isolated actions. In any case, the important thing to note is that in 
all cases the technical division of labour shows no substantial 
differences with the previous mode of organising production. 
 
In the co-operatives under study, the level of technology is often 
older than that of the leading companies in their respective product 
markets. The lack of initial capital, workers’ repayment of the 
company’s debts and the uncertainties associated with the legal 
situations of the co-operatives, do not provide sufficient financial 
resources for technological improvements and machines updates. In 
this context, workers should compensate this disadvantage by 
different means, which often entail savings arising from the 
elimination of managerial posts, but may also include work 
intensification as in the cases of UPP and Patricios, particularly 
during the start-up of the factory, but also beyond the founding 
period. Thus, market competition constrains workers’ choices as 
there is hardly any room for these companies to essay changes in 
the face of a hostile environment.  
 
While the technical division of labour appears as an improbable area 
for innovation, job rotation might have been considered to 
compensate the former, so alleviating workers from routines and 
repetitive tasks. However, none of the productive unities have 
adopted job rotation, in accordance with similar findings reported by 
scholars researching other experiences – with the remarkable 
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exceptions of FASINPAT/Zanon (ceramics), and to a lesser degree, 
Brukman (textile) (Aiziczon 2006; Fernández Alvarez 2005).  
 
However, it is worthwhile to note that interviewees say that learning 
new tasks would be useful to upgrade their skills and allow the 
replacement of fellow workers in case of necessity. Anecdotes of 
workers who have developed a better knowledge of different phases 
of the production process and learned new tasks abounded, as well 
as cases of production workers willing to get involved in 
administrative tasks, but often as the result of individual initiatives. 
Moreover, multi-tasking has been observed in different phases of 
production (workers attending the neighbour’s section of the 
machine for short periods, CUC/Patricios/UPP; or workers helping 
each others in the packing of the final product for a timely delivery, 
Patricios).  
 
In the case of the UPP, for instance, workers stress the existence of 
concrete barriers to implement a job rotation policy also due to the 
pressures arising from market competition. According to them, the 
latter restrict their chances to spend time in learning new tasks, for 
the operation of the machines requires not only specific technical 
knowledge but also practical experience to deal with daily minor 
inconveniences presented by out-of-date technology. Hence, 
workers recognise that job rotation would be valuable but not 
possible for the time being. Furthermore, and although findings 
were not conclusive, another source of resistance to job rotation 
seems to arise from skilled workers, who usually occupy a 
prominent role in the cooperatives under study. Typical of this is the 
case of CUC, where those with craft-knowledge are scarce, and 
therefore, enjoy a particular status. In this sense, the labour market 
proves to be another conditioning factor. The average wage of 
skilled workers is usually higher than the average income in the 
self-managed factories. Thus, the cooperatives should either pay for 
skilled workers in the labour market or secure them certain non-
monetary benefits.  
 
Yet, our argument would be misleading if the identification of the 
continuity as regards the materiality of the labour process and task 
design, leads us to downplay the extent of the changes brought 
about by workers’ self-management, in particular, with reference to 
the nature of the coordination of the labour process. While it is 
possible to identify key tasks and locations in the production 
process, the predominant feature is the de-centralisation of the 
decision-making as regards technical matters. In each case, 
workers communicate through formal and informal channels all 
along the process of production. Cooperation seems to be the 
leading motive. This is not to mean that there are no conflicts and 
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problems both within and between working groups. Indeed, there 
are, and the absence of job rotation as a policy contributes to 
increase the opportunities for workers to identify themselves with 
smaller groupings. Still, it has been observed in the majority of 
cases that cooperation prevails in most occasions (this for instance 
in the case of machines maintenance and identifying/solving 
problems in the chain of production).  
 
b.2.) Factories without bosses and also without discipline? 
 
As epitomised by the acronym of one of the most known cases of 
occupied factory, FASINPAT (factory without bosses), self-managed 
factories main characteristic is the elimination of managerial and 
supervisory posts, and hence, of the former system of control. As a 
consequence of this, the relaxation of discipline is noticeable in 
these factories. In the absence of vertical disciplinary apparatus, 
individual responsibility is the value advocated by interviewees to 
ensure a smooth process of production:  
 
‘the potential of this factory will be expressed if everybody 
understands that everybody has to behave in the proper way in the 
moment of production so as to transform raw materials into finished 
outputs’ (CUC, directive council). 
 
In addition to this, the role of individual responsibility is also to 
ensure the quality of the intermediate and final products.  
 
‘There is no quality control, each person does his/her own quality 
control and the person who receives the shoe, has to send the shoe 
back if it is discovered that has not been manufactured in the 
proper way’ (CUC, production).  
 
‘The quality is checked through all the production process and each 
person has a responsibility for his/her own work but also looks at 
the others’ (Patricios, production). 
 
However, the ideal of shared responsibility, conflicts sometimes 
against the reality of individual conduct, which deviates from the 
collective norms. This has pushed, even the most radical 
experiences like the UST, to adopt internal rule books: 
 
‘We had to introduce an internal code of rules otherwise there are 
cases of people coming at a quarter past eight, and it does not work 
in this way. We should not need to have an internal code of rules if 
all do what they are supposed to do, we all have the same 
responsibility, but at the end we need this book because there are 
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workmates that do not do what they are supposed to do’ (UST, 
directive council).  
 
In fact, the former system was always replaced by rule books 
discussed and agreed by workers in mass assemblies. Mainly, the 
rule books were thought to deal with absenteeism, negatives to find 
an accommodation to customary tasks and paces of work, and 
severe cases of misbehaviour (from robbery to fights between 
workers). Yet, money incentives, were maintained, or reintroduced 
when absenteeism threatened to become a problem. In the case of 
UST, for instance, the problem of unjustified absenteeism was 
debated by the collective of workers in the assembly and it was 
considered as an index of lack of individual consciousness. In the 
main, however, the problem was framed within a perspective, which 
stresses the links between individual effort and material reward: 
 
‘We need to understand that each kilo produced means money for 
the cooperative, money not for the owner but to be distributed 
among all of us’ (UPP, production).  
 
An evident consequence of the relaxation of the disciplinary system 
of control has been in all the factories the tendency to slow the pace 
of work. The dark side of this relaxation is that findings have shown 
that to achieve the needed output and match market demand, 
workers work longer hours when necessary. In the UPP, where 
machines cannot be stopped, the working day is 12 hours long so 
as to cover both shifts without employing more people. Although 
from observation these workers do not seem stressed or running 
against the clock and are often involved in moments of social 
interaction, young workers, recently integrated in the co-operative, 
in particular, are not happy of the long shifts which generate 
constant argument of debate. In Patricios, weekends are often 
working days and the use of overtime is practically compulsory, 
because newspaper and magazine printing is dependent on delivery 
deadlines fixed by the client. By the contrary, workers at CUC do 
not resign themselves to stay more than the regular 8 hours. As a 
consequence, there is an ongoing argument between those who 
think this is necessary to match products market demands and 
those who do not. In the cases of Patricios and UPP, however longer 
shifts are compensated by more comfortable production rhythms. 
Besides, in every case, no matter how many hours they are forced 
to work to remain competitive in the market, workers argue that 
the atmosphere of the workplace has been radically transformed by 
the elimination of supervisors and bosses. What workers seem to 
value most is their current freedom to move around the factory, to 
have longer rest-hours, and to communicate with each other 
without the risk of being punished.  
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As clearly stated by a worker: 
 
‘Before I could not go to the printing machines section without a 
specific reason, and the boss of the section used to tell me “you 
cannot stay here, you need to go to your section”. It was the same 
the other way round, when people from the printing section used to 
come here. Thus in this way they could maintain the division 
between different sections and also, because of a lack of 
communication, they created false rivalries’ (Patricios, production). 
 
In summary, it is possible to argue that the substitution of the 
former managerial authority with collective self-discipline/peers 
pressure is a process that still needs substantial developments. The 
substitution of the former managerial authority with another, albeit 
collective, form of authority is not a direct equation. With the 
disappearance of supervisors, the personification of capitalist 
authority also disappears. Yet, it is the authority of market 
competition the one that now directly, without any intermediaries, 
imposes on workers the respect of delivery times, product quality, 
and competitive prices. Thus the market itself may be seen as the 
fundamental regulator of workers’ discipline, and this in the forms 
of both collective sanctions, like with rules books and peer reviewed 
quality standards, and individual rewards.  
 
Here again, as previously in relation to both decision-making and 
the labour process, cooperatives face the same problem that has 
dominated critical thinking on the co-operative movement for 
decades: capital is expelled from the sphere of production just to be 
re-encountered in the sphere of circulation.  
 
Conclusions 
 
Following a long established tradition of critical thinking on the 
emancipatory potential of co-operative work, in our empirical 
analysis we have attempted to provide tangible evidence of the 
multiple limitations that market competition, and other related  
structural factors, imposes on workers’ experiences of self-
management.  
 
The occupation of the factories and their functioning under workers’ 
self-management produces a series of changes/adaptations in the 
sphere of production. The absence of the capitalist, of hierarchy, of 
intermediate managerial layers and forms of direct control, expel 
the despotic rationality of capital from the sphere of production and 
open a new space for workers’ intervention. This tends to be 
directed to the establishment of a more democratic, egalitarian and 
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participatory decision-making process at all levels, emphasised by 
the central role assigned to the general assembly and epitomised by 
the redistribution of the generated income in equal parts.  
 
Once the collective of workers is confronted with the market, those 
spaces of autonomy and control gained by workers after the 
expulsion of capital from the sphere of production, tend to be 
reduced. The need to take decisions quickly, to search for new 
clients, to decide about strategic investments, and, in short, to fully 
engage with other enterprises in the sphere of circulation, has 
immediate consequences on both the decision-making process and 
the organisation of work. 
 
As for the first aspect, we can see a tendency to reduce the space 
for collective decision and consequently a separation between 
productive and directive workers. As for the second aspect, the lack 
of initial capital, the obsolescence of the machines and the pressure 
of competition hinder the possibility for workers to learn new jobs 
and rotate, to avoid self-exploitation, or to reduce the intensity and 
the length of the working day.  
 
These findings, while in line with previous theoretical work on the 
subject, clearly show that any attempt to evaluate the perspective 
of self-management and generalise from particular experiences 
need to consider the existence of structural factors. Subjective and 
cultural explanations may have an important role insofar as these 
are consistently grounded in a vision of the capitalist system as 
dominating both the sphere of production and circulation.  
 
This ontological stance is fundamental to grasp the complex 
dynamics underlying workers’ experiences of self-management. In 
the Argentinean cases, workers reacted to structural conditions 
leading to their starvation by spontaneously occupying the plants 
and revolutionising the former system of control and decision. This 
is probably the most important insight coming form these 
experiences as it show how structural factors created the conditions 
for a workplace based class action. But in an inverse process, as we 
have shown, the market is limiting these changes forcing workers to 
compromise.  
 
Can workers resist the pressure of capitalist market forces? 
Certainly the whole process of occupation and the start-up of self-
managed production empowered and gave self-confidence to each 
worker and there are aspects of self-management on which workers 
are not ready to compromise. But this question needs to be 
answered by looking outside the workplace, a dimension for further 
research beyond the scope of this paper.  
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